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GUEST EDITORIAL: "No Shortcut to Power" The Wall Street Journal, April 3, 1972. 
The War Powers legislation now before the U. S. Senate is described by its a~~r, 
New York's Jacob Javits, as "one of the most important pieces of legis:n..a.tion in tn;:em 
national security field that has come before the Senate in this cent~~' ~ may~b ~~ 
since it purports to do that which the Founding Fathers were reluctani;!p at.temi>t::' ' the 
fairly precise delineation of the President's war-making powers. CD r:1 co ~,~ "-().l:::u '--D ,_,-
CD rn -.J r - .:.: >-
The bill, fashioned with backward glances at the origins of the llietnaitt' exper-ience, 
permits the President to deploy the armed forces in specified kinds of> emergencie~ 'fbr 
up to 30 days. To continue thereafter, he must have sought and received a congressional 
mandate to proceed or he would be forced to desist, his authority having expired. 
The measure has generated surprisingly little controversy. While the administration 
opposes it as being "unconstitutional and unwise," it has not been noticeably vigorous 
in lobbying against it. And with only scattered opposition, it's expected to pass easily 
in the Senate. Perhaps because detente, not war, is on the mind, and the Javits exercise 
now seems more philosophical than real. 
More specifically, the bill does seem to redress a grievance that has become widely 
acknowledged, that in recent decades Congress has allowed the Executive Branch to arrogate 
unto itself a disproportionate share of decision-making power in foreign policy. Thus, 
the Javits bill has the blessing of Sen. John Stennis of the Senate Armed Services 
Committee, who argues that in years ahead "it will be easier and easier to go to war, to 
get pushed into war by a series of decisions." He adds, "As I see it, one man - wise as 
he may be - after he gets so far cannot back up. And he is further along the line than 
he realizes, maybe." 
We thoroughly agree, but must confess to nagging doubts about the Javits approach. 
His bill assumes that it will force the Executive to consult more closely with Congress, 
out of anxiousness to win its concurrence in military enterprises. Yet it can just as 
easily be suspected that some future President may be forced to play his free hand for 
30 days without consulting Congress at all, believing Congress would not yank troops out 
of action once they have been committed. 
In opposing the war-powers legislation, former Under Secretary of State George Ball 
had this worry. He observed: "History never repeats itself with any precision, and it 
shows a capacity for infinite imagination, and I would think there is a danger that if we 
tried to spell the limits or the situations out too precisely there is going to be enormous 
pressure on the Executive, who feels it necessary to act in the interests of the country, 
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to make some very ingenious but rather fantastic constitutional interpretations of his 
own ••• " This isn't a concern to be dismissed lightly. Indeed, it has the ring of 
probability. 
But where is the alternative? How does the nation return to the partnership approach 
to decision-making in foreign policy, the approach that has eroded, at times collapsing 
altogether since the bipartisan understandings that marked the Truman and Eisenhower 
administrations? In those years, remember, the counsel of congressional leaders such as 
Lyndon Johnson strongly influenced President Eisenhower's decision to refuse to send U. S. 
airpower to rescue the French at Dien Bien Phu. 
An attempt to legislate a return to this halcyon era cannot succeed, and might even 
yield a perverse effect. It is not as easy for Congress to grant itself more power as 
it is for it to raise its salaries. The partnership approach can only survive where the 
political will exists, not only on Capitol Hill and in the White House, but in the nation 
at large. No statute can substitute for the hard work that must go into building a 
cooperative working arrangement between Congress and the Executive. 
Sen. Stennis himself suggests that the legislation "is of secondary importance." 
Rather, "The mos t important balance to be restored is the balance in the minds of the 
nation's citizens, both those who are inclined to surrender their own responsibilities 
of decision to the Executive, as many in the Congress have too often done, and those who 
believe that no cause is worth fighting for." For this, the people themselves have to 
commit themselves to deciding in the future whether or not to go to war. 
Sen Stennis thinks legislation won't hurt, and perhaps he is right. But we suspect 
it could also lead to the lazy notion that the war powers problem has been solved. While 
we can agree with Sen. Javits' objective, and applaud his good faith and earnestness, we 
doub t that his short cut to power will ge t him where he thinks it will. At the very leas t 
the Senate should be careful not to obscure the real point: The next time a decision is 
required on whether or not to commit the armed forces, once again the judgment will depend 
not on this law or that, but on the political will of the nation. 
FEATURE ARTICLE: LCOL William A. Hamilton III, U. S. Army 
"The Decline and Fall of the Joint Chiefs of Staff", Naval War College Review, April 7, 1972 
(Printed with permission of Naval War College Review)-----
EDITORIAL NOTE: This article traces the decline of the power of the Joint Chiefs through 
the Presidencies of Kennedy and Johnson, and through the era of McNamara. Since the role 
of President Kennedy and the Joint Chiefs during the Bay of Pigs incident is better 
publicized, it is not quoted in these exerpts from the article. The section on the JCS 
and President Johnson is quoted in this issue and that on the JCS and Secretary McNamara 
will be quoted in the next issue. The entire article makes easy and interesting reading 
and is recommended for all as an expression of one side of the events of that era. 
When Lyndon Johnson became the 36th President of the United States, his mental 
baggage included preconceptions of his own about the military. During the Johnson 
administration the JCS would be kept busy training and equipping troops and transporting 
them to Southeas t Asia, but they would not be called upon to act as the President's 
principal military advisers. They would be called upon to carry out military and political 
decisions reached in the White House between the President and a small group of trusted 
civilian advisers. 
Hugh Sidey, who covers the White House for Time-Life, provides insight into Johnson's 
ideas about military men in general in his book, A Very Personal Presidency: 
His deep suspicions of the military went back to his first days in the 
Congress ••• he was given a seat on Carl Vinson's powerful Naval Affairs Committee. 
There he watched the high brass parade, and he was disturbed. He found that 
too many military men grew arrogant behind the ribbons they wore on their 
chests. He found them contemptuous of new ideas, mean and thoughtl~ss in 
dealing with those below them. He detected an alarming amount of sheer stupidity 
which was self-perpetuating because of the academy caste system. He found 
no companionship with military men ••• ln fact, the general level of competence 
which Johnson found among the admirals who came before the Naval Affairs 
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Committee convinced him that the nation could not put its complete trust in 
the military in such hazardous times. How America met the threat had to be 
planned in detail, in Johnson's view, by the politicians. 
This lack of confidence in the officer corps never really left Johnson •• 
he felt that the military men almost always were too narrow in their apprai-
sals of a given problem, often ignoring the political implications in the 
United States or the reaction abroad ••• Johnson could be merciless when he 
told about the generals. None got harsher treatment than the old bomber 
pilot Curt LeMay, Chief of the Air Force under Kennedy and Johnson. LeMay 
was credited with having offered the advice for the air war in North Vietnam. 
''We ought to bomb them back into the stone age. " ••• Johnson subscribed 
heartily to an axiom that Kennedy propounded before his death. One night 
in his office with friends, JFK said, "Once you decide to send the bombers, 
you want men like LeMay flying them. But you can't let them decide if they 
should go or not." 
Johnson's own military experience was limited to one tour as a lieutenant commander 
in the Navy during World War II • 
•.• going into uniform as a Navy Lieutenant Commander on December 14, 
1941. He had a desk job in San Francisco from then until May 6, [1942] 
when he went into the Pacific as President Roosevelt's personal emissary. 
He arrived in the war sector on May 14. One month and four days later 
his tour of duty was over; a fever kept him in Australia a few more days 
but he was back in the States and out of uniform by July 16, 1942. 
As President Johnson assumed office, he inherited a foreign policy formulating 
Sructure modified to meet the needs and desires of a predecessor keenly interested in 
foreign affairs and impatient with bureaucracy. 
President Kennedy, acting on the advice of McGeorge Bundy and Walt Rostow, 
scrapped the entire structure of the National Security Council and chose to 
rely on small groups of flexible composition that were given responsibility 
for both policy formulation and execution with respect to particular countries, 
regions, or functional problems. 
The Joint Chiefs of Staff had similarly been written off by President Kennedy and 
eclipsed by the rising power of Secretary McNamara. This was a meager legacy for a new 
President who was passionately interested in domestic affairs and who had little interest 
in foreign and military affairs. As Townsend Hoopes points out: 
President Johnson, a man of little background and much uncertainty 
in foreign affairs, had inherited an organization for their conduct that 
had been made deliberately loose and flexible by President Kennedy, a man 
of broad knowledge, intuitive grasp, and determined initiative in that field. 
This inheritance, which adversely affected both the scope of deliberations 
on Vietnam policy and the quality of President Johnson's decisions from the 
fall of 1964 onwards, showed itself in the structural weakness of the 
National Security Council and in inadequate attention to longer-range policy 
planning. The principal results were fragmented debate, loose coordination, 
and an excessive concentration on problems of the moment. 
Early in his administration, Johnson could have conceivably changed U. S. policy in 
Vietnam. His administration was new, and in Vietnam President Diem and his brother Ngo 
Dihn Nhu were dead. During the next 18 months, 10 other South Vietnamese Governments 
were to- rise and fall. 
It was a time of great instability. Many speculate as to what President Kennedy 
would have done about Vietnam had he lived. Some think that he would have replaced Rusk 
and Rostow. But given Johnson's lack of expertise in foreign affairs, he chose to keep 
Rusk and Rostow, with Rostow eventually replacing McGeorge Bundy in 1966 as the President's 
National Security Affairs adviser. Given the same set of advisers and his own uncertainty, 
there was not much chance that Johnson would set a different course in Vietnam. "Under-
standably, President Johnson's opening policy theme was "Let us continue"; and just as he 
inherited the Kennedy Policies, so also the presidential elections still loomed ahead. 
Both considerations made it politically impossible for any change of couse in Vietnam. 
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As time went on Vietnam began to occupy more and more of the President's time, and a 
special means of dealing with the subject was devised: 
During the Presidency of Lyndon Johnson, Tuesday was a special day. 
Each week almost without exception, the President and his senior advisers 
gathered for lunch and deliberation in the President's Dining Room on the 
second floor of the White House. The agenda was unvarying: the war in 
Vietnam and the related questions that that intractable topic generated. 
Professor Henry F. Graff, who was brought to the White House from time to time to 
work on a history of Johnson's handling of the Vietnam war, asked Bill MOyers about the 
advice received by the President: "President Johnson, said Moyers, relies less on 
military advice than any President since Wilson." (I understood military advice to mean 
advice from the military.) 
President Kennedy's sad experience at the Bay of Pigs, which was the result of 
vacillation and insufficient coordination fostered by his own informal method of conducting 
business, brought about the installation of a situation room in the White House itself 
from which the President could personally command and control the Armed Forces. It was 
used during the Cuban missile crisis, and when President Johnson came to the White House 
that command and control of the war in Vietnam was exercised daily from 1600 Pennsylvania 
Avenue. 
To the dismay of the military, the President exercised extremely detailed control 
over the bombing of North Vietnam, including not only the target selection and the ord-
nance to be used, but also the execution of the strikes. Johnson and his civilian 
advisers conceived and pursued a strategy of "gradualism" in applying airpower, rather 
than accepting the JCS proposal that the bombing commence with the destruction of MIG 
airfields and air defense facilities in North Vietnam. The President was supported in 
his view by both McNamara and Taylor who" •••• wanted to test their theory of flexible 
response," which involved not a heavy bombardment but a series of attacks north of the 
demilitarized zone. Their theory was that if you twist someone's arm he can "cry uncle," 
but if you go for his neck from the beginning he does not get the chance. 
In essence, the Commander in Chief borrowed the means to make the strikes from the 
military but did not borrow or include the doctrine and tactics necessary to make their 
employment effective. As Hanson Baldwin points out: 
In 1965 when the bombing campaign started the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
recommended that some ninety-four key military targets be destroyed within 
two to three weeks in an overwhelming b 11 tz. The campaign was planned in 
accordance with the military principles of mass, momentum, and concentration 
to maximize the shock effects of air power to the full. North Vietnam's air 
defenses then were weak; her gasoline and petroleum storage, electric power, 
transportation, and other vital targets were concentrated and vulnerable; and 
the cumulative effect of destroying all these targets rapidly would, at the 
very least, have materially impeded Hanoi's aid to the Vietcong and might 
have shaken the North Vietnamese hierarchy. 
Undoubtedly the bombing as conducted by President Johnson made life more difficult 
.for the North Vietnamese, but it had little effect on the infiltration of men and supplies 
into South Vietnam. The long and drawn-out bombing episode provoked criticism of the 
United States both at home and abroad and was to prove to be a stumbling block rather than 
an inducement to negotiations. 
The frustrations of the military became known to the Congress who tried to intercede 
with the President: 
During a bombing pause [President Johnson] received a call from an 
influential Senator who offered some pointed military advice. ''Mr. President," 
said the caller, "you've got to win this thing now. You've got to go for the 
jugular. I urge you to turn this war over to your military commanders. They 
'I •• -
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are the men who know how to wage war, and they will win it." Johnson 
did not hesitate in his answer. "Not as long as I am President. As long 
as I sit here, the control will stay with the Commander-in-Chief." The 
Senator persisted: '~e've got to win it •••• That's why Roosevelt and 
Truman were so great. They let their military leaders do the job." Again 
Johnson had an answer. "I was around in those days," he said. "There 
were not many decisions made that Roosevelt did not know about. And Harry 
Truman watched everything closely ••• I 'm not going to let the hounds loose." 
Paradoxically, while the President exercised minute control over the bombing, he was 
generally content to allow his commander in the field, Gen. William C. Westmoreland and 
later Gen. Creighton Abrams to conduct operations in South Vietnam without interference. 
Unfortunately Johnson's strategy of "gradualism" was not compatible wi th the strategy of 
"attrition" being pursued by the U. S. Saigon Command. 
Returning to the model relationship, it cautions: 
•••• While military strategy may determine whether the aims of policy 
are possible of attainment, policy may, beforehand, determine largely the 
success or failure of military strategy. It behooves policy to ensure not 
only that military strategy pursue appropriate aims, but that the work of 
strategy be alloted adequate means and be undertaken under the most favorable 
condi tions • (Emphas is added.) 
Apparently, Johnson had great admiration for his top commanders in Vietnam. He was 
willing to provide them with almost anything that they wanted in terms of troops, material, 
and funds. But he was not willing, despite repeated pleas by by the JCS, to call up the 
Reserves whose combat support and combat service support units were badly needed. As a 
result, the support structure for the war came "out of the hide" of the active forces. 
The mobilization of the Reserves might have gotten the Nation involved in the war ' and 
perhaps behind the war effort, but Johnson's rule was "guns and butter." Thus the war was 
fought by a small professional cadre of officers and noncommissioned officers leading a 
force of conscripts who, as time went on, became increasingly aware of the inequity of 
the Nation's being involved in a major war while it was business as usual on Main Street. 
Johnson was willing to provide free mail service, ice cream, post exchanges-anything to 
make life in Southeast Asia more bearable-but he did not provide what was really needed -
a war policy which would permit his commanders to achieve the national aims. 
